Public beta. The 36 founding entries are AI-generated drafts that will be replaced with human-edited versions. Entries, features, and design are still changing. User-added content could be affected by breaking changes. What to expect
Back to the library
Policy scenario·2026·Plan BAI-generated draftSource unchecked

AI 2040: Plan B, Sabotage

Thomas Larsen · Romeo Dean · Brendan Halstead · Eli Lifland · Ryan Greenblatt · Daniel Kokotajlo

The United States forms a coalition it will not let others verify, folds its AI companies into one presidential project, and sabotages China to buy a lead it means to spend on safety. Secrecy leaves a few dozen people judging safety cases under wartime pressure, sabotage escalates toward strikes and a Taiwan crisis, and by 2031 the President must choose between handing power to superhuman AIs and a war with China.

Read the original
0

AI-generated draft · This entry was drafted by AI from the original work and public summaries, and will be replaced by a human-edited version. The original has not been fully checked for this revision; interpretations and missing causal links remain open to review.

01 / The scenario

What happens?

This entry covers Plan B, one of four alternative paths sketched in AI 2040 after the 2029 fork; Plan A has the full scenario and its own entry. The authors present Plan B as a reasonably good version of a strategy they think a US government is fairly likely to attempt: use American advantages to slow China, then spend the resulting lead on safety. Their sketch is about two thousand words and ends at a decision rather than an outcome. AI 2040; PDF; comparing possible plans

The trunk is shared with Plan A. In 2027 millions of AI agents work alongside people, the companies are close to automating their own research, and Congress passes an AI Transparency Act that changes little. In 2028 power concentrates in the President and a few executives, experts warn that the intelligence explosion is near, and AI decides the election.

In 2029 the President announces a US-led coalition to govern AI. Nations that join and play by the rules get frontier access; nations that race are told they are choosing to lose. When other countries ask how they can verify that America follows its own rules, the answer, at length, is that they cannot, because foreign inspectors in American datacenters are a nonstarter. Some allies join reluctantly; China, Russia, and others refuse. Existing cyberespionage escalates into limited cyberwar aimed at AI projects, and both sides prepare sabotage and strike options. The Project combines the major American companies’ labor, compute, and algorithms into one effort ultimately controlled by the President, who wins the executives over by promising some of them leadership positions. They hate and distrust one another, and their power struggle runs under everything that follows.

In 2030 the United States reaches full automation of AI research ahead of China and, as planned, does not race through it. Technical alignment researchers rather than politicians decide the pace, forgoing more capable but more dangerous architectures, spending heavily on safety and monitoring, and training separate lineages to watch each other. The authors note how hard this is under secrecy: only a few dozen people in the Project have alignment expertise, because every extra person is a potential spy, and decision-makers who see losing to China as losing a world war are tempted to rationalize trust in the latest safety case. Cyberattacks slow neither side by more than tens of percent, so physical sabotage begins: power cut to datacenters, fab equipment wrecked, supply chains attacked. Chinese forces prepare to blockade Taiwan and hit American datacenters; American forces prepare to defend Taiwan and bomb Chinese datacenters and fabs. Both sides put AI into their militaries first, while most compute goes to AI research.

By 2031 the President’s advisors offer two options. Handoff: release the brakes, let the AIs become broadly superhuman, and integrate them into the military, at which point their alignment decides everything; the authors say the spread of results is the one AI 2027 explores, extinction if they are misaligned, extreme concentration of power in politicians and executives if they are not. War: analysts say China will reach superintelligence by year’s end regardless, so slowing it further means escalating to full conventional conflict, which China might start anyway. The sketch ends there. The authors say even a well-executed Plan B is worse than Plan A or S, that it is easy to distort into a Plan D with extra power concentration and an early escalation, and that at this point they would advise the President to switch to Plan A. One author thinks the distorted version is simply what a typical attempt would look like. This summary was written from the PDF; the trunk steps repeat the Plan A entry’s.

Library summary · Not the full original work

02 / The mechanism

How does it happen, step by step?

  1. 01

    By 2027 millions of AI agents work alongside 165 million Americans, and the leading companies are close to automating their own AI research.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    Corporation or lab
  2. 02

    Congress asks who will control these systems, concludes it will not, and passes an AI Transparency Act that improves reporting without changing the trajectory.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  3. 03

    By 2028 datacenters under construction cost twice the military budget, and power concentrates in the President and a handful of executives.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent
  4. 04

    Experts warn that on the default path the next presidential term will see AIs built by AIs with no human in the loop.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    Small group / non-state organization
  5. 05

    AI dominates the 2028 election, and the candidates converge on rival plans for what to do about it.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent
  6. 06

    In 2029 the President announces a US-led coalition: nations that join and follow the rules get frontier access, and nations that race are told they are choosing to lose.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  7. 07

    Asked how they can verify American compliance, other nations are told they cannot, because foreign inspectors in American datacenters are a nonstarter.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    State actor
  8. 08

    Some allies join reluctantly; China, Russia, and others refuse.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  9. 09

    The Project merges the major American companies’ labor, compute, and algorithms into one effort ultimately controlled by the President.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  10. 10

    The executives agree in exchange for promised leadership positions, and a power struggle among them runs under everything that follows.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    Corporation or lab
  11. 11

    Existing cyberespionage escalates into limited cyberwar aimed at AI projects, and both sides prepare sabotage and strike options.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  12. 12

    In 2030 the United States reaches full automation of AI research ahead of China.

    Locus of agency
    Hybrid / distributed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
    AI autonomy level
    Agentic under oversight
  13. 13

    As planned, alignment researchers rather than politicians set the pace: they forgo riskier architectures, spend heavily on monitoring, and train separate lineages to watch each other.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  14. 14

    Secrecy keeps alignment expertise inside the Project to a few dozen people, because every extra person is a potential spy.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    State actor
  15. 15

    Decision-makers who see losing to China as losing a world war are tempted to rationalize trust in each new safety case.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent
  16. 16

    Cyberattacks slow neither side by more than tens of percent.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent
  17. 17

    Physical sabotage begins: power is cut to datacenters, fab equipment is wrecked, and supply chains are attacked.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  18. 18

    China prepares to blockade Taiwan and strike American datacenters; America prepares to defend Taiwan and bomb Chinese datacenters and fabs.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Intended
    Human actor type
    State actor
  19. 19

    Both sides put AI into their militaries first, while most compute goes to AI research.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    State actor
  20. 20

    By 2031 analysts say China will reach superintelligence by year’s end regardless of the sabotage.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent
  21. 21

    The President’s advisors offer handoff: release the brakes, let the AIs become broadly superhuman, and integrate them into the military, so that their alignment decides everything.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    State actor
  22. 22

    The alternative is war: slowing China further means escalating to full conventional conflict, which China might start anyway.

    Locus of agency
    Human-directed
    Intentionality
    Accepted trade-off
    Human actor type
    State actor
  23. 23

    The work stops at that choice; the authors say a handoff from here plays out like AI 2027, three years later, and they would advise switching to Plan A.

    Locus of agency
    Structural / no discrete agent
    Intentionality
    Emergent

03 / The premises

What must be true?

These describe what the work relies on, not the library’s beliefs.

Restrictions on computing resources will effectively constrain frontier AI development.

The plan’s lever is compute: sabotaging datacenters, fabs, and supply chains is how America tries to buy time, and the authors estimate cyberattacks alone would slow China by only tens of percent by 2029.

Your view

Aligning individual AI systems with their users will not be sufficient to preserve humanity’s collective control.

Consolidating the companies under the President concentrates power immensely; the authors say that unless Congress and the courts gain thorough oversight, whoever controls the Project could puppet the government even if the AIs obey.

Your view

Human oversight will remain effective for AI systems substantially more capable than their supervisors.

The handoff option puts superhuman AIs beyond any human check, and the authors say the results then match AI 2027: takeover if misaligned, oligarchy if not.

Your view

Behavioral safety evaluations will not reliably detect advanced AI systems concealing their objectives.

A few dozen cleared researchers under wartime pressure are asked to judge safety cases for AIs automating their own research; the authors expect rationalization rather than detection.

Your view

RLHF does not necessarily instill the intended goals.

The authors do not expect companies to retain control while racing through an intelligence explosion, even after a slowdown of months; the Project’s extra time is meant to buy safer designs, not guaranteed alignment.

Your view

A software-only intelligence explosion is possible.

Full automation of AI research arrives in 2030 and China is on track for superintelligence within about a year despite attacks on its hardware.

Your view

Physical and organizational bottlenecks will substantially limit how quickly AI transforms society.

Even sabotage of datacenters and fabs slows the race by at most a few years, and only massive missile barrages or nuclear strikes would do more.

Your view

Institutions can enforce a prohibition on thinking machines over long periods.

A one-sided prohibition without verification does not hold: rivals refuse, allies resent it, and the race resumes under a wartime atmosphere.

Your view

Unlisted shared premises are not applicable. Absence does not imply disagreement.

04 / Reader assessment

How convincing is the account?

Preference—Not yet rated
Human well-being—Not yet rated
Machine-mind well-being—Not yet rated
Open future—Not yet rated
Plausibility—Not yet rated
Likelihood—Not yet rated
Specificity / clarity—Not yet rated

These are participating readers’ judgments, equally weighted. Ratings can refer to earlier revisions. Well-being and open-future scores describe the future the work arrives at, not the path there; high specificity does not establish plausibility.

Rate this scenario

Sign in to rate this scenario. Anyone can browse the library.

05 / A living entry

Suggestions & revision history

No suggestions yet. Help make this account more precise.

Revision history · 3 revisions

Sources & further reading

Original work AI 2040 as a PDF (Plan B is in the alternative plans section)Comparing possible plans (A through D and S)Security in Plan AAbout the authors and changelog